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Abstract. Falsification of hybrid systems is attracting ever-growing attention in
quality assurance of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) as a practical alternative to
exhaustive formal verification. In falsification, one searches for a falsifying input
that drives a given black-box model to output an undesired signal. In this paper,
we identify input constraints—such as the constraint “the throttle and brake ped-
als should not pressed simultaneously” for an automotive powertrain model—as
a key factor for the practical value of falsification methods. We propose three
approaches for systematically addressing input constraints in optimization-based
falsification, two among which come from the lexicographic method studied in
the context of constrained multi-objective optimization. Our experiments show
the approaches’ effectiveness.
Keywords: Hybrid System Falsification, Signal Temporal Logic, Constraints,
Penalty, Lexicographic methods
1 Introduction
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) combine physical systems with digital controllers: while
the former are characterized by continuous dynamics, the latter are inherently discrete.
Such a combination is usually named as hybrid systems. The continuous dynamics of
hybrid systems leads to infinite search spaces, and this makes their formal verification—
especially automated methods—almost impossible. Therefore, research has followed a
more pragmatic approach by pursuing the falsification of the system: since checking
whether all inputs satisfy the specification is not feasible, falsification considers the
opposite problem and looks for an input that violates it. Formally, given a modelM that
takes an input signal u and outputs a signalM(u), and a specification ϕ (a temporal
formula), the falsification problem consists in finding a falsifying input, i.e., an input
signal u such that the corresponding outputM(u) violates ϕ.
State-of-the-art falsification approaches see the falsification problem as an opti-
mization problem. This is possible thanks to the robust semantics of temporal formu-
las [16, 22]; instead of the classical Boolean satisfaction relation v |= ϕ, robust seman-
tics assigns a value Jv, ϕK ∈ R∪{∞,−∞} that assesses not only whether ϕ is satisfied
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or violated (by the sign), but also how robustly the formula is satisfied or violated. Fal-
sification algorithms exploit this fact by iteratively generating inputs in the direction of
decreasing robustness, with the aim of finding an input with negative robustness (i.e.,
a falsifying input). Different optimization-based falsification algorithms have been de-
veloped [2,5,6,13,15–17,21,22,27,31–34]. See [26] for a survey. Moreover, also tools
have been developed, as BREACH [15], S-TALIRO [6], and FALSTAR [32], that work
with Simulink models.
In real scenarios, there usually exist some (input) constraints ψ over input signals.
For example, in an automotive system, one usually assumes that throttle and brake
should not be positive at the same time. Descriptions of CPS sometimes report con-
straints on the system inputs, e.g., [11, 25]. Therefore, when generating inputs for the
falsification problem, we should also guarantee that those inputs respect the constraints;
otherwise, there is the risk that the resulting falsifying input is unrealistic and thus use-
less. However, not too many research efforts have been spent on this problem in the
falsification community. To the best of our knowledge, explicit attempts to consider
input constraints in falsification have been made only in [10]. In [10], constraints are
represented in terms of a timed automaton, and inputs to be used for falsification are
sampled from the accepted words of the automaton. The main drawback of this ap-
proach is that it can only rely on sampling for falsification, and cannot take advantage
of more efficient optimization-based techniques.
Contribution In this paper we propose three approaches in which input constraints are
addressed explicitly in the falsification problem, and that still benefit from optimization-
based techniques. The general idea of the three approaches is to add a penalty factor to
the objective function for the inputs that do not satisfy the input constraints.
The first proposed approach consists in modifying the specification under falsifi-
cation in ψ → ϕ: the only way to falsify the whole formula is to satisfy the input
constraint ψ and falsify the specification ϕ. The penalty factor for the violation of the
input constraints is directly given by the STL robustness.
Our second approach employs the lexicographic method, a method developed in
multi-objective optimization [12]. In our adaptation of the method, the satisfaction of
the input constraints is embedded in a global cost function that must be minimized: if
the input constraints are not satisfied, the cost function is principally determined by the
degree of violation of the input constraints. In contrast, if the input constraints are sat-
isfied, the cost function value is only determined by the robustness of the specification
(as in the classical unconstrained falsification setting). The advantage of the approach
is that the satisfaction of the input constraints is prioritized w.r.t. the falsification of the
specification: indeed, it is useless to find a falsifying input that does not respect the
constraints.
The third approach tries to improve the second approach by simulating the model
only when the input constraints are satisfied. Although this can reduce the accuracy of
the search, it can also speed up the falsification process.
The three approaches have been experimented over 3 Simulink models and 17 spec-
ifications that are used in falsification competitions [20]; for each model, we experi-
mented the approaches using several input constraints of different complexity. Experi-
mental results show that the approaches can effectively handle the constraints. In terms
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of falsification capability, no approach is strictly better than the others, although lexico-
graphic methods seem better on average.
Paper structure §2 introduces some necessary background on the kind of models, speci-
fications, and algorithms used in falsification. Then, §3 presents our proposed approach,
and §4 describes some experiments we performed to evaluate it. Finally, §5 reviews
some related work, and §6 concludes the paper.
2 Background
In this section, we review the widely-accepted method of hill-climbing optimization-
based falsification. The core of making use of hill-climbing optimization is the intro-
duction of robust semantics of temporal formulas.
2.1 Robust Semantics for STL
Our definitions here are taken from [16, 22].
Definition 1 ((Time-bounded) signal). Let T ∈ R+ be a positive real. AnM -dimensional
signal with a time horizon T is a function w : [0, T ]→ RM .
Let w : [0, T ] → RM and w′ : [0, T ′] → RM be M -dimensional signals. Their
concatenation w · w′ : [0, T + T ′] → RM is the M -dimensional signal defined by
(w ·w′)(t) = w(t) if t ∈ [0, T ], and (w ·w′)(t) = w′(t− T ) if t ∈ (T, T + T ′].
Let 0 < T1 < T2 ≤ T . The restrictionw|[T1,T2] : [0, T2−T1]→ RM ofw : [0, T ]→
RM to the interval [T1, T2] is defined by (w|[T1,T2])(t) = w(T1 + t).
We treat the system model as a black box, i.e., the system behaviors are only observed
from inputs and their corresponding outputs. We therefore simply define the system
model as a function.
Definition 2 (System modelM). A system model, with M -dimensional input and N -
dimensional output, is a function M that takes an input signal u : [0, T ] → RM and
returns a signal M(u) : [0, T ] → RN . Here the common time horizon T ∈ R+ is
arbitrary. Furthermore, we impose the following causality condition on M: for any
time-bounded signals u : [0, T ] → RM and u′ : [0, T ′] → RM , we require thatM(u ·
u′)
∣∣
[0,T ]
=M(u).
Definition 3 (STL syntax). We fix a set Var of variables. In STL, atomic propositions
and formulas are defined as follows, respectively: α ::≡ f(x1, . . . , xN ) > 0, and
ϕ ::≡ α | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ∧ ϕ | ϕ∨ ϕ | ϕ UI ϕ. Here f is an N -ary function f : RN → R,
x1, . . . , xN ∈ Var, and I is a closed non-singular interval in R≥0, i.e. I = [a, b] or
[a,∞) where a, b ∈ R and a < b.
We omit subscripts I for temporal operators if I = [0,∞). Other common connectives
such as→,>, 2I (always) and 3I (eventually), are introduced as abbreviations: ϕ1 →
ϕ2 ≡ ¬ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, 3Iϕ ≡ > UI ϕ and 2Iϕ ≡ ¬3I¬ϕ. An atomic formula f(x) ≤ c,
where c ∈ R, is accommodated using ¬ and the function f ′(x) := f(x)− c.
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Definition 4 (Robust semantics [16]). Let w : [0, T ] → RN be an N -dimensional
signal, and t ∈ [0, T ). The t-shift of w, denoted by wt, is the time-bounded signal
wt : [0, T − t]→ RN defined by wt(t′) := w(t+ t′).
Let w : [0, T ] → R|Var| be a signal, and ϕ be an STL formula. We define the
robustness Jw, ϕK ∈ R ∪ {∞,−∞} as follows, by induction on the construction of
formulas. Here
d
and
⊔
denote infimums and supremums of real numbers, respectively.
Their binary version u and unionsq denote minimum and maximum.
Jw, f(x1, · · · , xn) > 0K := f(w(0)(x1), · · · ,w(0)(xn))Jw,⊥K := −∞ Jw,¬ϕK := −Jw, ϕKJw, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2K := Jw, ϕ1K u Jw, ϕ2K Jw, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2K := Jw, ϕ1K unionsq Jw, ϕ2KJw, ϕ1 UI ϕ2K := ⊔t∈I∩[0,T ]( Jwt, ϕ2K udt′∈[0,t)Jwt′ , ϕ1K )
For atomic formulas, Jw, f(x) > cK stands for the vertical margin f(x)− c for the
signal w at time 0. A negative robustness value indicates how far the formula is from
being true. It follows from the definition that the robustness for the eventually modality
is given by Jw,3[a,b](x > 0)K = ⊔t∈[a,b]∩[0,T ]w(t)(x).
The above robustness notion taken from [16] is therefore spatial. Other robustness
notions take temporal aspects into account, too, such as “how long before the deadline
the required event occurs.” See e.g. [3,16]. Our choice of spatial robustness in this paper
is for the sake of simplicity, and is thus not essential.
The original semantics of STL is Boolean, given as usual by a binary relation |=
between signals and formulas. The robust semantics refines the Boolean one in the
following sense: Jw, ϕK > 0 implies w |= ϕ, and Jw, ϕK ≤ 0 implies w 6|= ϕ,
see [22, Prop. 16]. Optimization-based falsification via robust semantics hinges on this
refinement.
2.2 Hill Climbing-Guided Falsification
For the falsification problem, hill-climbing optimization is the main applied technique [2,
4,6,13,15–18,26,27,31,33], and different tools exist, as BREACH [15], S-TALIRO [6],
and FALSTAR [32]. We here formulate the falsification problem.
Definition 5 (Falsifying input). LetM be a system model, and ϕ be an STL formula.
A signal u : [0, T ] → R|Var| is a falsifying input if JM(u), ϕK ≤ 0; the latter implies
M(u) 6|= ϕ.
Definition 6 (Unconstrained falsification problem). The technique for solving a fal-
sification problem is via transforming it into an optimization problem, shown as follows:
minimize
u
JM(u), ϕK
subject to u ∈ Ω
(1)
In practice, the system input signal u is represented with a finite set of variables de-
fined over the search space Ω (a hypercube). The use of quantitative robust semantics
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JM(u), ϕK ∈ R∪{∞,−∞} in the above problem enables the use of hill-climbing op-
timization. Hill climbing is a family of metaheuristics-based optimization algorithms,
which is usually used for handling black-box optimization. The hill-climbing optimiza-
tion scheme is shown as Fig. 1.
Fig. 1: Hill-climbing optimization
The algorithm is iterative: in every loop, it
takes some samplings and computes the fitness of
them. Globally, the sampling process is divided
into two stages: random initial samplings and the
sequent samplings based on the observation of
sampling history in order to minimize the objec-
tive function. The most expensive step in each
loop is given by the computation of the fitness that
requires to simulate the system. Hill-climbing in-
cludes various implementations of stochastic op-
timization algorithms. Examples are CMA-ES [8]
(used in our experiments), SA, and GNM [28].
3 Penalty-Based Approaches for Handling Input Constraints
The problem setting of falsification introduced in Def. 6 does not take into consider-
ation possible constraints over the input signals, which limits the practicality of the
falsification techniques in real contexts. Indeed, some works [11, 25] report that input
constraints do exist in CPS.
In this paper, we tackle the problem of handling input constraints in optimization-
based falsification.
Definition 7 (Constrained falsification problem). The constrained falsification prob-
lem can be stated as follows, where ψ are input constraints, expressed in STL, over the
input signals u.
minimize
u
JM(u), ϕK
subject to u |= ψ
u ∈ Ω
In our approach, input constraints ψ are assumed to be expressible in STL.
More generally, constraints in optimization solutions have been studied in the field
of optimization: see [23] for an overview. For example, the death penalty method [9]
discards all the solutions that violate the constraints; while this method can work well
when the feasible search space is convex, it does not work well in general, and par-
ticularly in our context where the constraints can be arbitrarily complex. Other more
advanced methods (static penalty, dynamic penalty, and adaptive penalty) add a penalty
factor to the objective function [23], so that solutions violating the constraints are pe-
nalized during the search.
In this work, we follow this second line of research in which we add, to the objective
function of falsification, a penalty related to the non-satisfaction of the input constraints.
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We propose three approaches: a simple approach based on the modification of the spec-
ification under study is presented in §3.1, while two more advanced approaches based
on lexicographic methods are proposed in §3.2 and §3.3.
3.1 Constraint Embedding approach
A straightforward penalty-based approach to the constrained falsification problem con-
sists in embedding the input constraints ψ as a prerequisite of the system specification
ϕ. In this way, we obtain the STL formula ψ → ϕ as a new falsification goal.
The constrained problem of Def. 7 can be stated as the following unconstrained
problem.
minimize
u
J〈u,M(u)〉, ψ → ϕK
u ∈ Ω
The falsification approach must now evaluate the robustness of a formula that pred-
icates both over the input and output signals, formally denoted as 〈u,M(u)〉.
The soundness of the approach is given by Thm. 1.
Theorem 1 (Soundness of the Constraint Embedding Approach). If there exists an
input signal u such that J〈u,M(u)〉, ψ → ϕK ≤ 0, then the input constraints ψ are
satisfied and the specification ϕ is falsified.
The proof directly comes from the robustness definition of STL and the semantics
of the implication.
3.2 Lexicographic Method approach
While the constraint embedding approach can be effective in some cases, it does not
dictate a search algorithm to first satisfy input constraints ψ and then falsify the spec-
ification ϕ. We here propose a method that imposes a strict prioritization between the
satisfaction of the input constraints and the optimization of the objective function for
falsification. This method is based on the use of a lexicographic method [12] for defin-
ing the fitness function of the optimization problem.
A lexicographic method [12] can be applied for a multi-objective optimization prob-
lem that aims at minimizing objective functions f1, . . . , fN , and for which there exists
a preference order in the optimization of the objective functions, i.e., functions with
higher priorities must be optimized first. Formally, there exists a total order of priorities
p1, . . . , pN , where pk = N − k for each k ∈ {1, . . . , N}; the larger pk is, the higher
priority fk has.
minimize
x
f1(x), . . . , fN (x) (2)
subject to x ∈ Ω
The method defines a global cost function GCF in the following way:
GCF (x) =
N∑
k=1
Bpkd(B − 1)Tk
(
fk(x)
)e (3)
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where B ∈ R+ with B > 1 is a base number, de is the regular ceiling operator, and
each Tk is a transformation function. Note that d(B − 1)Tk
(
fk(x)
)e is needed to map
the transformed value of the objective function fk in B quantization levels. Such a
quantization is required by the lexicographic method to maintain the total order of the
inputs [19] w.r.t. the priorities of the objective functions, i.e., the fitness value of a un-
achieved function with higher priority always dominates the fitness values of functions
of lower priority. Note that the value of B can have an effect on the efficiency of the
search [19], as also noted during the application of the lexicographic methods in other
contexts [30]. In the experiments, we will evaluate such effect using different values for
B.
The definition of a Tk is specific to the type of optimization problem; for example,
we will see later how to define it for the constraint satisfaction problem and the falsifi-
cation problem. In any case, the definition of a Tk must at least satisfy the monotonicity
property, i.e., given two values v1 ≤ v2, then Tk(v1) ≤ Tk(v2). Usually, a transforma-
tion function Tk is implemented as a normalization function between [0,1]: in such a
case, the values of fk that are mapped to 0 are those that achieve the objective.3
We apply the lexicographic method to the constrained falsification problem intro-
duced in Def. 7. To do this, we first turn the constrained falsification problem in an
unconstrained multi-objective problem as follows.
minimize
u
Ju,¬ψK (4)
minimize
u
JM(u), ϕK (5)
subject to u ∈ Ω
The constraint satisfaction problem has been turned into an optimization problem by ex-
ploiting the robust semantics of STL (recall that also the input constraints are expressed
in STL). Since in a lexicographic method all objective functions must be minimized
(see Eq. 2), we consider the negation of the input constraints (negative robustness of
¬ψ corresponds to positive robustness of ψ).
We can now combine the two objectives (Eq. 4 and Eq. 5) into a single global
cost function, following Eq. 3. Since we want to prioritize the satisfaction of the input
constraints, we take Ju,¬ψK as f1, and JM(u), ϕK as f2. The definition of the global
cost function is as follows.
Definition 8 (Lexicographic fitness function GCF fal for falsification). Let f1(u) :=Ju,¬ψK, and f2(u) := JM(u), ϕK. The definition of the global cost function for the
constrained falsification problem is as follows:
GCF fal(u) = Bd(B − 1)T1(f1(u))e+ (B − 1)T2(f2(u))
As explained before, the definition of a transformation function Tk is specific to the
kind of optimization problem. In our context, the transformation function T1 considers
3 Note that, in general, it is not always possible to specify when an objective function is
“achieved”. However, the lexicographic methods require that for functions f1, . . . , fN−1, this
is possible, and this is applicable in our context.
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values r given by the robustness evaluation of the input constraints: for any negative
value of the robustness, the input constraints are satisfied, while positive values indi-
cate the degree of violation of the input constraints ψ. Therefore, T1 is defined as a
normalization function as follows:
T1(r) =
{
0 r < 0
r
Rψmax
otherwise (6)
where Rψmax is the possible maximum value of r. The identification of a correct R
ψ
max
requires minimum effort by sampling the input space. We will present how we come up
with Rψmax later in §4.
The transformation function T2, instead, considers values r given by the robustness
evaluation of the specification ϕ. Also in this case, negative values of the robustness
mean that the objective is achieved (i.e., the specification is falsified). Therefore, the
definition of the transformation function for T2 is as follows:
T2(r) =
{
0 r < 0
r
Rϕmax
otherwise (7)
where Rϕmax is the possible maximum value of r. We will also explain later in §4 how
we select a proper Rϕmax .
Considering the definitions of the two transformation functions, we can now anal-
yse the behaviour of function GCF fal (see Def. 8). Given an input signal u, if the input
constraints ψ are satisfied, the first operand of the sum will be 0 (due to the transforma-
tion function T1 in Eq. 6), and therefore the value of GCF fal will only depend on the
robustness value of the temporal specification (i.e., the second operand). On the other
hand, if the input constraints are not satisfied, the first operand will be positive and guar-
anteed to be larger than the second one (so driving the search towards the satisfaction
of the input constraints).
Note that in the definition of GCF fal, we do not apply the ceiling operator to the
robustness evaluation of the specification ϕ (i.e., f2). It is indeed known that the ceiling
operator is not really needed by the lexicographic method for the last operand of the
sum [12, 30], and we take advantage of this. Therefore, since f2 corresponds to the
falsification algorithm, we prefer to remove the ceiling in order to preserve as much
information as possible regarding the specification robustness that could be helpful for
driving the search. Indeed, removing the ceiling avoids the quantization effect that in
general is adversarial for the hill-climbing search.
Theorem 2 (Soundness of the GCF fal fitness function). If there exists an input sig-
nal u such that GCF fal(u) = 0, then the input constraints ψ are satisfied and the
specification ϕ is falsified.
The proof directly comes from the definitions of GCF fal, T1, and T2, and the ro-
bustness definition of STL.
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3.3 Partially Simulation Free Lexicographic Method approach
In this section, we present a variation of the plain application of the lexicographic
method presented in §3.2. The current technique takes into account a particular feature
of our problem: regarding the two objective functions in Eq. 4 and Eq. 5, the compu-
tation of Ju,¬ψK does not need system simulation, while computation of JM(u), ϕK
does. Since system simulation is the most time-consuming process (as we have already
observed in §2.2), we adapt the GCF fal function into a partially simulation free version
GCF fal sf that avoids running simulations when ψ is not satisfied, so saving time.
Definition 9 (Lexicographic fitness functionGCF fal sf for falsification). Let f1(u) :=Ju,¬ψK, and f2(u) := JM(u), ϕK. The definition of the partially simulation free global
cost function for the constrained falsification problem is as follows:
GCF fal sf(u) =
{
Bd(B − 1)T1(f1(u))e if f1(u) > 0
(B − 1)T2(f2(u)) otherwise
Note that the only difference between Def. 8 and Def. 9 is when the input constraints
ψ are not satisfied (first case): in this case, Def. 9 ignores the system specification in
Eq. 5 (so, no system simulation is performed), and thus GCF fal sf(u) is only decided by
the robustness of the input constraints, i.e., Ju,¬ψK; otherwise, it is the same as Def. 8.
In the second case, we do not report the first operand of the sum that is 0 because the
input constraints are satisfied.
Note that the definition of GCF fal sf still guarantees the priorities between the two
objective functions, i.e., inputs violating the input constraints still have higher fitness
values than those satisfying them.
The soundness of the approach still holds, as stated in Thm. 3.
Theorem 3 (Soundness of the GCF fal sf fitness function). If there exists an input
signal u such that GCF fal sf(u) = 0, then the input constraints ψ are satisfied and the
specification ϕ is falsified.
The proof is similar to that of Thm. 2.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In order to evaluate the proposed techniques, we show their application to the bench-
marks commonly used in the falsification community [20]. Specifically, we experi-
mented them on 3 Simulink models, and 17 specifications to achieve comprehensive
and reliable evaluation results. Note that the documents reporting the original Simulink
models and temporal specifications do not provide any input constraints. Therefore, for
each model, we identified some input constraints of different kinds, by using different
logical and relational operators, and considering different input signals. The 3 Simulink
models and their specifications are reported in Table 1a. The input constraints are re-
ported in Table 1b.
In the following, we provide a detailed description of the benchmarks.
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Table 1: Benchmarks of temporal specifications and input constraints in STL. Here, wt
represents the t-shift of w (see Def. 4) and ∆t(w) represents wt −w.
(a) Temporal specifications ϕ
Model Spec. ID Temporal specification in STL
AT
AT1 2[0,30] (speed < 120)
AT2 2[0,30] (gear = 3→ speed ≥ 19)
AT3 2[0,30] (gear = 4→ speed ≥ 35)
AT4 ¬(2[10,30]((50 < speed) ∧ (speed < 60)))
AT5 ¬(2[10,30]((53 < speed) ∧ (speed < 57)))
AT6 2[0,29](speed < 100) ∨ 2[29,30](speed > 75)
AT7 2[0,29](speed < 100) ∨ 2[29,30](speed > 70)
AT8 2[0,30](rpm < 4770 ∨ 2[0,1](rpm > 1000))
AT9 2[0,30](rpm < 4770 ∨ 2[0,1](rpm > 700))
AT10 2[0,30](rpm < 3000)→ 2[0,20](speed < 65)
AT11 2[0,10] (speed < 50) ∨3[0,30] (rpm > 2520)
AT12 2[0,26](∆4(speed) > 40→ ∆4(gear) > 0)
AT13 2[0,27](∆3(speed) > 30→ ∆3(gear) > 0)
AFC
AFC1 2[11,50](µ < 0.22)
AFC2 2[11,50](3[0,10](|µ| < 0.05))
NN
NN req ≡ 2[0,16](¬close ref → reach ref in tau)
close ref ≡ |Pos − Ref | ≤ α1 + α2 · |Ref |
reach ref in tau ≡ 3[0,2](2[0,1](close ref ))
NN1 NN req with α1 = 0.003, α2 = 0.04
NN2 NN req with α1 = 0.01, α2 = 0.03
(b) Input Constraints ψ
Model Constr. ID Constraint in STL
AT
AT con1 2[0,30](throttle = 0 ∨ brake = 0)
AT con2 2[0,30](throttle ≤ 20 ∨ brake ≤ 50)
AT con3 2[0,30](throttle > 3 · brake ∨ brake > 3 · throttle)
AT con4 2[0,24](throttle > 70→ throttle6 < 10)
AT con5 2[6,30](throttle = 0 ∨ brake = 0) ∧ 2[0,6](brake = 0)
AFC
AFC con1 2[0,50](Pedal Angle ≥ 50→ Engine Speed > 1000)
AFC con2 2[0,20](∆10(Pedal Angle) ≥ 0)
NN
NN con1 2[0,12](∆6(Ref ) ≥ 0)
NN con2 3[0,18](Ref > 2.5)
The Automatic Transmission (AT) model [24] is a typical benchmark model in fal-
sification. It has two input signals, throttle ∈ [0, 100] and brake ∈ [0, 325], and several
output signals including speed , rpm , gear , etc. Specifications AT1, . . . , AT13 mainly
concern safety of the system in different aspects. In the experiments, we consider 5
different input constraints, by considering both throttle and brake , or only throttle.
The Abstract Fuel Control (AFC) model [25] takes two input signals, Pedal Angle
andEngine Speed , and outputs the controller mode subject toPedal Angle , and a ratio
µ reflecting the deviation of air-fuel-ratio from its reference value. In our experiment,
we set the range of Pedal Angle ∈ [8.8, 70] to keep the model in a normal mode,
Constraining Counterexamples in Hybrid System Falsification 11
and Engine Speed ∈ [900, 1100] consistent with [25]. Specifications AFC1 and AFC2
reason about the related safety properties. We created two different input constraints,
one constraining the value Engine Speed w.r.t. the value of Pedal Angle , and another
one constraining the value of Pedal Angle over time.
The third benchmark model is based on MathWork’s Neural Network controller
(NN) for a magnet system. Specifications NN1 and NN2 formalize the safety require-
ment about the position Pos of the magnet w.r.t. its reference value Ref , which ranges
over [1, 3]. Since Ref is the only input signal, we cannot reason about input constraints
over different signals. Therefore, we just specified two input constraints over Ref : the
first one requiring Ref to be non-decreasing, and the second one requiring Ref to be
larger of 2.5 in at least one time point.
In the lexicographic method-based approaches proposed in §3.2 and §3.3, we need
to choose a proper base number B and transformation functions T1 and T2 for the
global cost function. Regarding B, we performed a preliminary experiment by compar-
ing the performance of the approaches using different values ofB: from the experiment
described in RQ3, B = 10 resulted to be one of two best settings (see Table 4). There-
fore, for the main experiments of the paper reported in Table 3, we used 10 as base
number B. As for transformation functions T1 and T2, we need to determine Rψmax
and Rϕmax in each case (see §3.2). We handle this problem as follows. We take a small
set of samplings of the input space and compute their robustness values (both for the in-
put constraint and the specification). Then, for the input constraints, we determineRψmax
by multiplying the maximum value of the obtained robustness values by a reasonable
factor, namely 1.5. For the specification, we determine Rϕmax in a similar way.
In our experiments we use CMA-ES [8], one of the state-of-the-art stochastic opti-
mization algorithms for black box, as an implementation of hill-climbing optimization.
The experiments use Breach version 1.2.13 on an Amazon EC2 c4.2xlarge instance
(2.9 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2666 v3 Processor, 15 GB main memory).
4.1 Evaluation
In order to evaluate our proposed approaches, we first check the performances of a
state-of-the-art falsification tool (BREACH) that does not consider input constraints dur-
ing falsification; we name such unconstrained approach as Baseline Approach (BA). We
run falsification using BA over all the specifications reported in Table 1a with a time-
out budget of 600 secs. In order to account for random variation of the approach, each
experiment has been performed 30 times, by following guidelines of reporting results
for randomized algorithms [7]. Table 2 reports the experimental results. For each spec-
ification, it reports the falsification rate (FR) as the number of experiments for which
a falsifying input has been found, and the average execution time over the successful
executions. Moreover, for each input constraint ψ reported in Table 1b, we also check
whether the found falsifying input satisfies (by chance) ψ: the Constraint Satisfaction
Rate (CSR) reports the number and percentage of falsifying inputs that also satisfy the
input constraints. FR informs us about the complexity of the falsification problem, and
we will use it later in the experiments to see how handling the input constraints affects
the falsification problem. Regarding CSR, we observe that, most of the times, the falsi-
fying input violates the input constraint: in such a case, the falsifying area of the input
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Table 2: Results of falsification without considering the input constraints (FR: Falsifi-
cation Rate (out of 30) – CSR: Constraint Satisfaction Rate (out of falsifying inputs))
(a) Automatic Transmission
CSR
AT con1 AT con2 AT con3 AT con4 AT con5
FR (/30) time (s) # % # % # % # % # %
AT1 30 27.06 1 3.3% 1 3.3% 1 3.3% 0 0 0 0
AT2 20 29.3 1 5% 7 35% 0 0 20 100% 0 0
AT3 12 25.36 0 0 2 16.7% 1 8.3% 10 83.3% 0 0
AT4 30 41.06 1 3.3% 3 10% 1 3.3% 26 86.7% 1 3.3%
AT5 28 157.09 0 0 2 7.1% 2 7.1% 25 89.3% 0 0
AT6 20 96.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AT7 18 87.09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AT8 13 58.88 0 0 1 7.6% 0 0 0 0 0 0
AT9 13 131.27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AT10 30 46.04 0 0 3 10% 1 3.3% 30 100% 0 0
AT11 23 227.32 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 100% 0 0
AT12 6 50.6 0 0 1 16.7% 0 0 0 0 0 0
AT13 21 23.15 0 0 1 4.8% 0 0 0 0 0 0
(b) Abstract Fuel Control
CSR
AFC con1 AFC con2
FR (/30) time (s) # % # %
AFC1 30 44.79 8 26.7% 1 3.3%
AFC2 6 211.82 0 0 0 0
(c) Neural Network controller
CSR
NN con1 NN con2
FR (/30) time (s) # % # %
NN1 20 163.57 0 0 8 40%
NN2 27 26.43 1 3.7% 7 25.9%
space is not strictly contained in the feasible area satisfying the input constraints. In
few cases, the input constraints are satisfied with a high percentage, meaning that there
is a big overlap (if not proper inclusion in case of 100%) between the falsifiable area
and the feasible area.
Then, we run the three approaches proposed in the paper over all the benchmarks.4
We name as CE the Constraint Embedding approach presented in §3.1, as LM the ap-
proach based on Lexicographic Method presented in §3.2, and as LMsf its modification
presented in §3.3. Also in this case, all the experiments have been performed 30 times.
Table 3 reports the experimental results. Note that, by definition, all the approaches
return falsifying inputs that respect the input constraints, i.e., CSR is always 100% and
so it is not reported. The table only reports FR and time.
We analyse the results using 3 research questions.
RQ1 Does constraint handling affect the falsifiability rate?
First of all, we want to observe that, in most of the cases, FR of the three approaches
is diminished w.r.t. that of BA (i.e., BREACH without constraint handling). This is ex-
pected, because almost all the falsifying inputs found by BA do not satisfy the input con-
4 Technically, we modified the fitness evaluation of BREACH to use the 3 new fitness functions.
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Table 3: Experimental results (FR: Falsification Rate)
(a) Automatic Transmission
AT con1 AT con2 AT con3 AT con4 AT con5
FR (/30) time (s) FR (/30) time (s) FR (/30) time (s) FR (/30) time (s) FR (/30) time (s)
AT1
CE 18 78.62 26 64.05 14 88.43 13 367.26 15 114.72
LM 2 378.25 19 138.01 3 178.62 14 350.78 16 303.89
LMsf 0 - 15 89.22 3 169.69 19 316.92 9 125.93
AT2
CE 5 85.19 18 44.91 23 62.21 22 24.7 10 59.57
LM 10 33.75 10 56.63 25 49.82 21 47.47 0 -
LMsf 10 9.29 11 17.71 21 19.53 26 25.7 0 -
AT3
CE 2 126.5 6 34.38 11 60.46 17 28.28 9 64.35
LM 6 38.05 5 49.92 11 83.93 16 15.81 0 -
LMsf 6 26.49 7 24.72 14 29 17 27.24 0 -
AT4
CE 23 136.14 30 73.7 9 80.81 30 35.37 23 143.71
LM 11 273.27 28 70.69 28 137.06 30 42.73 30 183.5
LMsf 12 132.63 28 175.28 26 86.96 30 42.98 23 74.72
AT5
CE 21 260.97 28 195.83 8 278.95 30 156.36 13 259.86
LM 3 332.99 28 173.75 21 286.24 30 174.9 14 326.72
LMsf 5 239.26 28 175.28 25 180.69 30 134.08 17 243.24
AT6
CE 5 406.83 13 263.15 4 203.02 1 421.7 4 470.8
LM 1 594.79 5 405.46 5 317.91 1 395.75 0 -
LMsf 0 - 5 229.01 5 197.38 0 - 0 -
AT7
CE 0 - 0 - 0 - 4 465.65 0 -
LM 0 - 0 - 5 351.57 2 528.73 0 -
LMsf 0 - 0 - 2 203.09 2 395.26 0 -
AT8
CE 7 362.45 8 241.13 1 450.03 0 - 10 372.02
LM 7 184.5 6 86.59 1 176.33 0 - 4 211.28
LMsf 5 99.62 9 72.49 1 26.84 0 - 3 103.04
AT9
CE 7 401.25 6 356.97 0 - 0 - 7 385.24
LM 10 182.46 9 70.64 1 105.46 0 - 4 172.34
LMsf 3 75.76 12 72.27 0 - 0 - 5 108.18
AT10
CE 15 186.41 29 117.35 18 201.62 30 36.56 24 167.23
LM 7 133.63 25 149.34 25 182.6 30 28.28 17 81.18
LMsf 8 63.62 27 97.33 24 147.82 30 32.67 19 155.15
AT11
CE 10 234.12 22 223.15 3 307.46 26 264.61 13 261.85
LM 2 184.39 22 220.04 1 554.55 21 260.33 1 51.71
LMsf 2 404.31 25 178.26 4 203.27 21 253.18 13 261.84
AT12
CE 8 103.62 7 62.48 4 141.61 2 190.71 2 159.95
LM 9 147.38 15 89.01 11 118.55 1 166.02 8 149.39
LMsf 4 87.93 12 63.96 13 80.96 1 183.14 4 120.75
AT13
CE 8 97.34 15 37.02 8 67.82 5 149.97 8 123.05
LM 16 147 15 61.32 15 116.86 10 74.4 7 108.82
LMsf 16 45.97 15 49.92 13 53.4 7 63.53 7 30.95
(b) Abstract Fuel Control
AFC con1 AFC con2
FR (/30) time (s) FR (/30) time (s)
AFC1
CE 25 120.17 23 356.78
LM 29 56.32 29 53.55
LMsf 29 49.03 29 46.89
AFC2
CE 10 312.48 5 284.98
LM 11 350.47 10 139.01
LMsf 9 160.95 11 197.00
(c) Neural Network controller
NN con1 NN con2
FR (/30) time (s) FR (/30) time (s)
NN1
CE 11 152.26 26 192.28
LM 16 181.65 24 139.79
LMsf 15 210.55 19 217.30
NN2
CE 23 82.01 29 84.09
LM 19 66.45 30 67.99
LMsf 17 51.73 22 68.35
straints, and so our approaches correctly focus only on the feasible area. Note that, in the
few cases in which also BA had 100% CSR (e.g., AT2 with input constraint AT con4),
the falsification rate of the proposed approaches is the same as that of BA, and some-
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Table 4: Comparison of different values for base B (FR: falsification rate)
base
AT con2 AT con3
base
AT con2 AT con3
base
AT con2 AT con3
FR (/30) time (s) FR (/30) time (s) FR (/30) time (s) FR (/30) time (s) FR (/30) time (s) FR (/30) time (s)
AT2
LM
5 9 45.44 26 41.04
AT5
LM
5 25 247.24 23 257.94
AT13
LM
5 13 63.51 14 68.09
10 10 56.63 25 49.82 10 28 173.75 21 286.24 10 15 61.32 15 116.86
100 15 34.78 22 43.22 100 26 180.92 27 252.89 100 16 53.73 10 133.94
1000 13 33.33 20 46.38 1000 25 261.10 25 267.52 1000 11 90.65 6 182.43
LMsf
5 9 16.16 24 13.49
LMsf
5 28 189.06 14 241.07
LMsf
5 11 34.06 13 51.13
10 11 17.71 21 19.53 10 28 175.28 25 180.69 10 15 49.92 13 53.40
100 16 26.07 25 20.80 100 24 181.10 24 199.52 100 14 46.60 12 84.43
1000 13 30.07 24 26.53 1000 26 174.37 28 191.11 1000 10 72.59 10 117.91
times even better. This holds also for cases in which CSR was high but not 100% for BA
(e.g., AT3 with input constraint AT con4).
RQ2 How do the three proposed approaches perform?
We are here interested in comparing the performance of the three proposed ap-
proaches. Regarding FR, in 11 out of 73 cases, the performances of the three approaches
are the same. For the remaining 62 experiments, in 28 cases CE is strictly better or equal
than the other two approaches. Although quite simple, CE can be effective in some cases.
However, the lexicographic methods seem to be better on average.
Regarding LM and LMsf, in 28 cases they have the same FR, while in 24 cases LM is
better than LMsf, and in 21 cases the other way round. This means that the optimization
implemented by LMsf of not simulating the inputs that violate the input constraint, has
a positive effect in some cases; however, when simulation is skipped, the objective
function does not receive any contribution related to the robustness of the specification,
and this may weaken the falsification ability of the approach.
Regarding the computation time when a falsifying input is found, LMsf is faster
than LM in 47 cases out 61 (in which both approaches find a falsifying input). This
confirms that LMsf does indeed speed up the process. However, there are some notable
exceptions. For AT11 with input constraint AT con5, LMsf is much slower, but it has a
much better falsification rate: this may be due to the fact that the time saved is used for
exploring other inputs that turned out to be falsifiable and feasible (while LM, in 29/30
cases, timeouts without finding any falsifying input).
RQ3 Is there any influence in using different values for the base parameter in the
lexicographic methods?
In §3.2, we have described that the global cost function of a lexicographic method
requires to define a base numberB, that it is only required to be larger than 1. However,
literature shows that different values of B can affect the performance of the underlying
optimization problems [12, 30]. In this RQ, we investigate which is the effect of the
choice ofB in our approaches. We selected 3 specifications of the AT benchmark (AT2,
AT5, and AT13), and 2 input constraints (AT con2 and AT con3). For the six combina-
tions, we run the two lexicographic methods LM and LMsf using 4 values for B, namely
5, 10, 100, and 1000. Results are reported in Table 4. We observe that there seems to be
an effect on the falsification results. The two extreme cases of B equal to 5 and to 1000
almost always produce the worst results, while the best results are distributed between
the cases in which B is 10 or 100. This is expected, as low values of B produce more
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areas having flat robustness values (due to the combined use of the ceiling operator and
B) for the input constraints and the specification: therefore, in this case, the search may
not find the right direction. On the other hand, high values of B generate a global cost
function that prioritizes “too much” the first objective related to the input constraints,
and a modification of the robustness of the specification has less effect on the global
cost function (given a same value for the robustness of the input constraints).
5 Related work
Stochastic optimization-based falsification technique has drawn great many research
attentions in recent years [2, 5, 6, 13, 15–17, 21, 22, 27, 29, 31–33], and becomes one of
the most effective approaches to quality assurance of CPS products. Most of research
efforts focus on developing or improving search techniques, and a lot of techniques
were proposed to handle the “exploration and exploitation” trade-off, which is a core
problem in search-based testing. Notably some recent works [5, 14, 32] introduce ad-
vanced machine learning techniques into falsification, improving the effectiveness and
efficiency substantially. A comparison of the state-of-the-art tools is given in [20].
Our work bridges the gap between effectiveness and practicality of falsification, as
few works consider the meaningfulness of falsifying results. This problem was studied
in [10], where they use timed automata to formalize the input constraints and gener-
ate meaningful samplings. However, the proposed framework cannot be integrated into
the state-of-the-art hill-climbing optimization-based falsification framework. Other ex-
amples include [25], in which they mentioned an approach similar to our Constraint
Embedding approach to handle an input profile. Earlier works [29] use sampling tech-
niques so they can handle input constraints more complicated than bound constraints.
The constrained optimization problem is one of the major research directions in the
optimization community. However, a large amount of the research is based on white-
box model. Techniques on black-box models are more challenging as no derivative
information is given. Genetic algorithm (GA) (or more generally, evolutionary algo-
rithm (EA)) is a big branch of such techniques. A comprehensive list of literatures on
handling constraints in GA is maintained [1].
6 Conclusion and Future work
The paper presented three approaches for handling the input constraints in optimization-
based falsification of hybrid systems. They implement, in different ways, a penalty
method that adds a penalty factor to the fitness function that penalizes inputs that vio-
late the input constraints. Experiments showed that each of the three approaches per-
forms better in some cases. We believe that this depends on the relationship between
the feasible area and the falsifying area of the input space. As future work, we plan to
perform more detailed experiments in this direction to better characterize the strengths
and weaknesses of the three approaches.
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